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A Balanced Approach to Affirmative Action
Discovery in Title VII Suits
By Lynne Charlotte Hermle*
Executive Order No. 11,246,1 issued on September 24, 1965,
was designed to assure increased enforcement2 of the antidis-
crimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.8 The
Order requires that most government contracts4 contain a provi-
sion in which the employer agrees not to discriminate on the basis
of race, creed, color, national origin,5 or sex.6 Additionally, the Or-
der requires the employer's commitment to affirmative action.7
* B.A., 1978, University of California, Santa Barbara. Member, Third Year Class.
1. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compliation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Exec-
utive Order No. 11,246 has been held to have the force and effect of law. Contractors Ass'n
of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Local 189,
United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. La. 1968), affd, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). For a detailed history of Executive
Orders promulgated to encourage fair employment practices, see Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa.
v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 168-71 (3d Cir. 1971).
Section 201 of the Executive Order authorizes the Secretary of Labor to adopt regula-
tions necessary to achieve the purposes of the Order. The regulations repeat the provisions
of the Order and provide detailed procedures to further the Order's provisions. See 41
C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1-1.47 (1979). When possible, a parallel citation to corresponding sections of
the regulations is given.
2. BAuIsTER, Fall, 1976, at 71.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
4. The requirements of Executive Order No. 11,246 do not apply to contracts of
$10,000 or less, certain contracts for indefinite quantities, contracts to be performed outside
the United States, contracts with religious educational institutions, contracts for work to be
performed on or near Indian reservations, and any additional contracts that the Director
exempts from the provision. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5 (1979).
5. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339-40 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
6. Executive Order No. 11,246 originally prohibited only discrimination on grounds of
"race, creed, color, or national origin." On October 17, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson
signed Executive Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation), which extended
the requirements of 11,246 to prohibit discrimination based on sex.
Executive Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964-1965 Compilation), prohibits discrimi-
nation by federal contractors on the basis of age. The analysis of this Note, therefore, also
applies generally to discovery efforts by plaintiffs in Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) suits. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
7. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 202, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in
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To comply with the obligations imposed by the Order, the
contracting employer must draft an affirmative action plan" in
which it candidly discusses the minority hiring, firing, and promo-
tion policies of the company.9 The plan also must include statisti-
cal data on such practices, as well as time tables, projections, and
goals for minority employment policies.10 The contractor is ex-
pected to be openly self-critical in the plan and to discuss any
problem areas fully.1 The Director of the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance Programs, charged with enforcement of the Ex-
ecutive Order, 12 has entrusted certain "compliance agencies" with
primary responsibility for monitoring compliance with the Order's
provisions. s
Persons interested in the content of the submitted plans fre-
quently attempt to obtain them either from a compliance agency
or from the contracting company during litigation. Plaintiffs bring-
ing federal14 employment discrimination suits 5 against govern-
ment contractors are often interested in a company's self-analysis
of minority employment policies.10 There are two procedures by
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976); see also 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1979).
8. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1979). See generally Kelly & Thorkelson, Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity: Affirmative Action Programs for Federal Government Contractors, 31
Bus. LAw. 1509 (1976). For a model affirmative action plan, see Panken & Davin, A Model
Affirmative Action Program, PRAc. LAW., April 15, 1980, at 11-39.
9. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1979).
10. Id. § 60-2.12.
11. See id. § 60-2.10.
12. Id. § 60-1.2.
13. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.46 (1979) authorizes the Director to delegate authority, subject to
his or her "general direction and control." For a list of the review assignments of the com-
pliance agencies, see Galloway, Administrative and Judicial Nullification of Federal Af-
firmative Action Law, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 559, 563 (1977).
14. The federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings under the
Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976).
15. The plaintiff in a Title VII action may be either the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) or a private individual. An employee who feels that he or she has
been the victim of discrimination prohibited by Title VII must fie a complaint with the
EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC conducts an investigation to determine whether proba-
ble cause for the charge exists. Id. If the EEOC finds that there is probable cause, the
agency will negotiate possible remedies with the employer. Id. The EEOC can then file suit
against the employer if the negotiations fail to bring about a solution. The employee may
file suit 90 days after the Commission gives notice of its failure to settle and its decision not
to fie suit, or 180 days after the filing of the charge if no conciliation agreement has been
reached and no suit has been fied. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). See generally B. ScHLEI & P. GROSS-
MAN, EMPLoYmENT DisCRIMINATION LAW (1976 & Supp. 1979).
16. Attempts by Title VII plaintiffs to obtain an employer's affirmative action plans
must be distinguished from attempts by individual Title VII plaintiffs to procure informa-
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which they can procure materials contained in the plans. The first
is a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request; the second in-
volves pretrial discovery procedures.
In either situation, a plaintiff's request creates a conflict be-
tween his or her interest in obtaining the plans and a defendant's
interest in protecting the documents from disclosure. Defendants
frequently contest disclosure of the plans, claiming that the plans
contain sensitive and confidential information, which, if disclosed,
would injure the defendant's competitive position. These defen-
dants further argue that the plans are protected by a public policy
privilege, alleging that disclosure of the affirmative action plans
will result in less candid self-evaluation in the future. Additionally,
some defendants have claimed that the work product privilege is
applicable to the plans. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that
the plans are needed to overcome the heavy burden of proof in-
volved in establishing a case of discrimination.
Federal district court cases conflict on the issue of the discov-
erability of affirmative action plans in discrimination suits. Four
federal district courts have refused to grant Title VII plaintiffs ac-
cess to defendants' affirmative action plans. 17 Five district courts
have reached the opposite conclusion.' 8 One of the latter decisions
tion contained in the files of the EEOC. This information is accumulated by the EEOC in
its investigation of a plaintiff's complaint. Title VII limits the authority of the EEOC to
make public disclosure of this information. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). The United States
Supreme Court has recently held that the EEOC may disclose confidential information ob-
tained in Title VII investigations to employees who have filed Title VII actions. See Associ-
ated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 49 U.S.L.W. 4150 (1981).
17. Federal district courts in the Southern District of Ohio, Northern District of Geor-
gia, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Western District of Pennsylvania have refused to
grant plaintiffs access to the plans where the information was available through other
sources, or the plan was not pertinent to the cause of action. See Johnson v. Southern Ry.,
19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6639 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Parker v. Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6163
(N.D. Ga. 1977); Stevenson v. General Elec. Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5148 (S.D. Ohio 1978);
Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5070 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Rodgers
v. United States Steel Corp., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6815 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Sanday v. Carnegie-
Mellon Univ., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6795 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 4
Empl. Prac. Dec. 5520 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
18. Courts in the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
Northern District of Texas, Northern District of Georgia, and Western District of Missouri
have granted plaintiffs' discovery requests for the plans. See EEOC v. Quick Shop Mkts.,
Inc., 396 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Mo.), af'd, 526 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1975); Webb v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Ligon v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 19 F. E. P. Cas. 722
(N.D. Tex. 1978); Ylla v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5897 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
EEOC v. I.S.C. Fin. Corp., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5586 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
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was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.19
This Note evaluates whether plaintiffs involved in discrimina-
tion suits against their employers should be able to obtain the em-
ployer's affirmative action plans through pretrial discovery proce-
dures. After discussing FOIA attempts to obtain the plans, the
Note examines the public policy and work product privileges as-
serted by defendants in response to discovery requests. The Note
concludes that the work product privilege is inapplicable to pre-
vent disclosure of affirmative action plans and that although courts
should consider the public policy issues involved in disclosure of
the plans, public policy review should constitute only one compo-
nent in a comprehensive inquiry aimed at balancing both plain-
tiffs' and defendants' interests. Finally, the Note proposes a bal-
ancing test to be used by the courts in determining whether to
permit disclosure of affirmative action plans to plaintiffs who seek
them in pretrial discovery.
Suits Brought Under the Freedom of
Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act,20 which provides for in-
creased disclosure of information by federal government agencies,21
is a redrafted version of section 3 of the Administrative Procedure
Act 2 2 (APA). Section 552(a) of the FOIA provides that each gov-
ernment agency shall make information available to the public and
sets forth the procedures for disclosure.23 Section 552(b) creates
19. EEOC v. Quick Shop Mkts., Inc., 526 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1975).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1976). For a general discussion of the provisions of the Act, see
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 761 (1967); Note,
Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEo. L.J. 18 (1976). For a
discussion of recent developments under the Act, see Comment, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Act-1979, 1980 DuKE L.J. 139.
21. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965). "Government agencies" sub-
ject to the FOIA mandates are defined broadly. The Act states: "For the purpose of this
subchapter-(l) 'agency' means each authority of the Government of the United States,
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include-(A)
the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the governments of the territories or
possessions of the United States; (D) the government of the District of Columbia." 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 (1976).
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). See Note, Freedom of Infor-
mation: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEo. L.J. 18, 18-19 (1976).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976).
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nine exemptions to the Act's disclosure provisions.24 Because the
exemptions are expressly stated to be exclusive,, courts have nar-
rowly construed them26 and have held that the primary objective
of the Act is to provide a mechanism for disclosure.
24. Id. § 552(b). Section 552(b) provides that the disclosure provisions of § 552(a) do
not apply to matters that are: "(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; (2) related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; (3) specifically exempted from disclo-
sure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) re-
quires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discre-
tion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld; (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7)
investigatory records compiled'for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a crimi-
nal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investi-
gation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose in-
vestigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel; (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation
or supervision of financial institutions; or (9) geological and geophysical information and
data, including maps, concerning wells." See generally Comment, The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act: A Survey of Litigation Under the Exemptions, 48 Miss. L.J. 784 (1977).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976) provides in part: "This section does not authorize with-
holding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically
stated in this section." See also Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935,
938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). Contra, Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dis-
missed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971) (suggesting that courts have equity discretion
to bar disclosure of materials that do not fall within one of the express exemptions to the
FOIA). But see Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 678 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that that
holding in Consumers Union was a moot point).
26. See Olson v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1978); Theriault v. United States,
503 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1973); Fisher
v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067,
1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971); Tax Analysts &
Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (D.D.C. 1973); Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F.
Supp. 467, 469 (D.D.C. 1972); Pilar v. S.S. Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D. 159, 162 (D. Md. 1972).
27. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 290 (1979); Department of Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973); Theriault v. United
States, 503 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1974); Legal Aid Soc. v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 774-75
(N.D. Cal. 1972). This view is supported by the legislative history. The House Report on the
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Persons seeking FOIA disclosure need not have any personal
interest in the requested materials. While the earlier version of the
APA provided for disclosure only "to persons properly and directly
concerned,'28 the FOIA now requires government agencies to dis-
close requested information to "any person. ' 29 Any private individ-
ual, therefore, may initiate the FOIA disclosure procedure by sub-
mitting a request 0 to the agency possessing such information.
Because the offices responsible for monitoring compliance with Ex-
ecutive Order No. 11,246 are within the definition of "government
agency" in the FOIA,31 a Title VII plaintiff may seek a defendant's
affirmative action plans from the compliance agencies under the
Act.
FOIA requests for affirmative action plans are frequently
met3 2 with "reverse FOIA" suits."s In these suits, the supplier of
FOIA provides: "A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the
intelligence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies....
[The FOIA] provides the necessary machinery to assure the availability of Government in-
formation necessary to an informed electorate." H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1966). See also S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1965).
28. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238. See Davis, The Information Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 765 (1967).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). As the FOTA does not require that a requester be
"properly and directly concerned," one seeking the affirmative action plans need not be a
Title VII litigant at the time the request is made. Moreover, one requesting the plans under
the FOIA will not be refused because the information pertains to pending or anticipated
litigation. See generally Symposium, Obtaining Access to Information in the Files of Gov-
ernment Agencies: The Corporate Perspective, 34 Bus. LAW. 993 (1979) (remarks of Peter
C. Hein). In the discussion, Mr. Hein notes: "How does a request for information pursuant
to the FOTA differ from discovery pursuant to the federal rules or applicable state court
rules? The short answer is that there is no relationship, as such, between access under the
FOIA and discovery. Both are independent means of obtaining information and each has its
own relative advantages andYelative disadvantages. Thus, one can engage in a fishing expe-
dition under the FOIA without regard to whether the documents requested are relevant or
material to the issues in any pending litigation. Similarly, one can obtain documents under
the Act even in advance of litigation, and one can obtain documents concerning nonparties
to the litigation under the Act, all without any necessity for complying with the applicable
discovery rules concerning discovery in advance of litigation or discovery of nonparties. In
addition, when suit is brought under the FOJA the burden of proof is on the government to
show that an exemption applies. Furthermore, it is conceivable-although for a corporate
plaintiff I do not think very likely-that you could recover attorneys' fees, or a portion of
your attorneys' fees." Id. at 994.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). For information on making a successful FOIA request, and
sample FOIA request forms, see J. O'RELLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE §§ 7.01-.08,
F-4 (1977).
31. See note 21 supra.
32. The agency possessing the information may notify the employer when FOIA re-
quests are made for information submitted by that employer. Employers can utilize "watch
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information to the government agency brings an action to block
release of the information to a third party. Reverse-FOIA plaintiffs
generally have argued that the FOIA exemptions create an implied
right of action under the Act allowing private parties to assert the
exemptions as a bar to government disclosure of information to a
third party.s Additionally, these plaintiffs often have asserted sup-
plemental causes of action under the APA 5 and section 1905 of
the Trade Secrets Act in attempting to bar disclosure of the affirm-
ative action plans.,3
In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,3 7 the United States Supreme
Court outlined the cause of action available to a reverse-FOIA
plaintiff. The plaintiff in Chrysler brought suit to enjoin a compli-
ance agency from releasing the plaintiff's affirmative action plans
to a third party. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's asser-
tions that the FOIAss and section 1905 of the Trade Secrets Act39
impliedly create a private right of action to enjoin government dis-
closure of information. However, the Court did find that section
service" companies, which, for a fee, inform clients when such requests are made. See Sym-
posium, Obtaining Access to Information in the Files of Government Agencies: Discussion,
34 Bus. LAW. 1003, 1013 (1979) (remarks of Peter C. Hein).
33. For a general discussion of reverse-FOIA suits, see Campbell, Reverse Freedom of
Information Act Litigation: The Need for Congressional Action, 67 GEO. L.J. 103 (1978);
Note, Reverse FOIA Suits After Chrysler: A New Direction, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 185
(1979) [hereinafter cited as A New Direction]; Note, "Reversing" The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act: Congressional Intention or Judicial Invention?, 51 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 734 (1977).
See also Wachtell, Disclosure to Third Parties of Information Filed With Government
Agencies: Preventing Disclosure to Third Parties, 34 Bus. LAw. 1049 (1979) (suggesting
means of preventing agency disclosure). For a reverse-FOIA model complaint, see J.
O'REiLLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DisCLOsuRE, at F-32 (1977).
34. For cases in which plaintiffs have raised this argument, see A New Direction,
supra note 33, at 188 n.25.
35. Under the APA, a reviewing court may set aside agency actions that are "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1976). See A New Direction, supra note 33, at 190-91.
36. The Trade Secrets Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), is a criminal statute
prohibiting disclosure of confidential business information by government officials in a man-
ner "not authorized by law." See A New Direction, supra note 33, at 192-93.
37. 441 U.S. 281 (1979). For an extensive discussion of Chrysler, see Note, Chrysler
Corporation v. Brown: Seeking a Formula for Responsible Disclosure Under the FOIA, 29
CATH. U.L. REV. 159 (1979); A New Direction, supra note 33.
38. 441 U.S. at 294. In Chrysler, the plaintiff argued that materials falling within the
express exemptions of the FOIA were conclusively barred from agency disclosure. The Court
rejected the plaintiff's argument, stating: "Congress did not design the FOIA exemptions to
be mandatory bars to disclosure." Id. at 293. Accordingly, the Court found that a contractor
who wishes to enjoin agency disclosure does not have a private cause of action under FOIA.
39. Id. at 316-17.
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10(a) of the APA 0 provides reverse-FOIA plaintiffs with a means
of obtaining judicial review of a compliance agency's action.41 The
Court found that Chrysler was a person "adversely affected or ag-
grieved" within the meaning of section 10(a) and held that the
compliance agency's decision to release the plans was a reviewable
agency action."2
After Chrysler, a reverse-FOIA plaintiff can enjoin a compli-
ance agency from disclosing affirmative action plans by establish-
ing that disclosure violates section 10(a) of the APA. Under section
10(a), a reviewing court may set aside agency actions that are arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise "not in accor-
dance with law."'43 If the disclosure is held to violate section 10(a),
presumably the agency will be permanently enjoined from disclos-
ing the plans.44 In Chrysler the Court expressly refused to deter-
40. See note 35 supra.
41. 441 U.S. at 316-18.
42. Id.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
44. Although the Court held that § 1905 of the Trade Secrets Act did not afford re-
verse-FOIA plaintiffs a private right of action, it stated that a disclosure that violated
§ 1905 because it revealed confidential business information in a manner not authorized by
law would be "not in accordance with law" under the APA and could be set aside by the
reviewing court. Id. at 316-17. Section 1905, therefore, is still relevant to a reverse-FOIA
cause of action. The construction of a reverse-FOIA cause of action under this formula is
quite complex. A reverse-FOA plaintiff must show that the planned disclosure is an unau-
thorized disclosure under § 1905 and is thus "not in accordance with law" under the APA.
The plaintiff must show that the material comes within one -of the FOIA exemptions; other-
wise, the general FOIA disclosure provisions provide the requisite "authorization of law"
which precludes the application of § 1905. A reverse-FOIA plaintiff must show both that the
material to be disclosed comes within a FOTA exemption and that disclosure is otherwise
unauthorized within the meaning of § 1905 of the Trade Secrets Act to demonstrate that
disclosure of the material will violate the APA.
Two of the nine FOIA exemptions are relevant to affirmative action plans: exemption
three, which protects materials specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, and exemp-
tion four, which exempts trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information.
See note 24 supra. Reverse-FOA plaintiffs have argued that, because § 1905 prohibits un-
authorized disclosure, the material is "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute"
under exemption three and therefore, because the disclosure is within a FOIA exemption, it
is not "authorized by law" under § 1905. However, most courts have rejected the argument
that § 1905 is not a statute "specifically exempting disclosure," and that exemption three
does not apply to preclude disclosure of affirmative action plans. See A New Direction,
supra note 33, at 195 n.71.
It is less clear whether affirmative action plans come within the confidential commerical
information category of exemption four. The courts have divided on the issue. See Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 158 (D.D.C. 1976) (citing cases). One com-
mentator has suggested that the courts answer the question on a case by case basis. See A
New Direction, supra note 33, at 196. If the court determines that the plans do not come
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mine whether affirmative action plan disclosure by compliance
agencies was not in accordance with law, and the issue remains to
be decided in future cases.
4 5
Resolution of this issue is important to Title VII plaintiffs who
seek defendants' affirmative action plans. If affirmative action plan
disclosure is found to be "not in accordance with law" under the
APA, plaintiffs theoretically would not be able to obtain the plans
under the FOIA.46 In practice, however, this result would not
greatly affect affirmative action plan disclosure, because obtaining
information through the FOIA is frequently a difficult and frus-
trating process.4 7 Agencies are often reluctant to grant FOIA re-
quests, 48 and completion of FOIA procedures can be time consum-
ing.49 The difficulty of obtaining affirmative action plans through
within exemption four, they fall under the general FOIA mandate and will not come within
§ 1905 or the APA. The plans must then be disclosed under the FOIA. If the court finds
that the material comes within exemption four, the reverse-FOIA plaintiff is free to argue
that the materials fall under § 1905 of the Trade Secrets Act and thus under the APA.
Whether agency disclosure of affirmative action plans violates §, 1905 also remains un-
clear. The issue is now before the district court in the remanded Chrysler case. See note 45
infra. The better view is that it does not and that disclosure is "in accordance with law"
under the APA. See A New Direction, supra note 33, at 200-01. Under this view, however, a
reverse-FOIA plaintiff will be able to argue that an agency disclosure, although not violative
of § 1905, is otherwise "not in accordance with law" under the APA.
45. On remand, the Third Circuit held that the district court should decide the issue,
and remanded the case to the district court. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 611 F.2d 439 (3d
Cir. 1979).
46. See note 44 supra.
47. See generally C. STENBERG, THE INFORMATION ESTABLISHMENT 19-20 (1980); Be-
lair, Less Government Secrecy & More Personal Privacy? Experience with the Freedom of
Information and Privacy Acts, Civ. LIB. Rxv., May/June 1977, at 10, 13-15. But cf.
Halperin, The Freedom of Information Act: How to Find out More and Pay Less, 34 Bus.
LAW. 1041, 1046-48 (1979)(suggesting that agencies are becoming less reluctant to release
information).
48. See authorities cited at note 47 supra.
49. Originally, the FOIA did not contain explicit deadlines for agency responses to
disclosure requests. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) (amended 1974). As one commentator noted:
"Delay in responding to requests for information was characterized as being of 'epidemic
proportion.' . . . The House Committee on Government Operations concluded that 'the de-
lay by most Federal agencies in responding to an individual's request for public records
under the FOI Act, or delay in acting on an administrative appeal frequently has negated
the basic purpose of the Act.'" Recent Decisions-Administrative Law, 11 GA. L. REv. 241,
245 n.21 (1976). In 1974, Congress amended the FOTA to require an agency to determine
whether to comply with the request within 10 working days. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (1976). If
the agency refuses to disclose the information, an appeal by the applicant must be decided
within 20 working days. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A). See generally Open America v. Watergate Spe-
cial Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 610 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Clark, Holding Government
Accountable: The Amended Freedom of Information Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741 (1975). How-
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the FOIA, coupled with the possibility of reverse-FOIA litigation
under the APA, magnifies the importance of plan disclosure to Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs through pretrial discovery procedures.
Obtaining Affirmative Action Plans Through
Pretrial Discovery
The scope of pretrial discovery in Title VII cases is particu-
larly broad. ° One court has held that Title VII discovery is limited
only by relevancy and burdensomeness.5 1 This does not mean,
however, that plaintiffs' pretrial discovery requests for affirmative
action plans are routinely approved.5 2 Although judicial rationales
for denying access have varied slightly,53 courts denying discovery
have generally held that work product or public policy privileges
bar affirmative action plan disclosure.54
The Work Product Privilege
Three federal district courts denying affirmative action plan
disclosure have cited work product concerns as a basis for their
decisions. In Parker v. Kroger,55 Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co.,
5 6
ever, many agencies continue to circumvent the deadlines. See Hayden v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 413 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1976) (FBI estimated that it would take four
years to complete Tom Hayden's request for information concerning himself).
50. See Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 552 F.2d 333, 344 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing
cases). See also Burns v. Thinkol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1973); Milner
v. National School of Health Tech., 73 F.R.D. 628 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
51. See Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 343 (10th Cir. 1975).
52. See note 17 supra.
53. See Johnson v. Southern Ry., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6639 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (denying
plaintiff's discovery access to the affirmative action plans on public policy grounds alone);
Stevenson v. General Elec. Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5148 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (same); Parker v.
Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6163 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (denying plaintiff access to the plans
on grounds of public policy and work product privilege); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 4
Empl. Prac. Dec. 5520 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (same); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 12
Empl. Prac. Dec. 5070 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that the plans were not necessary to plain-
tiff's case; therefore, the public policy against disclosure outweighed plaintiff's need); Rod-
gers v. United States Steel Corp., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6815 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (denying plain-
tiff access to the plans on grounds of work product privilege alone); Sanday v. Carnegie-
Mellon Univ., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6795 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that plaintiff possessed
much of the information contained in the plans in interrogatory answers and applying pub-
lic policy privilege).
54. See note 53 supra. The fact that the plaintiff has made a successful or unsuccess-
ful FOIA request for the plans will have no bearing upon the discovery request. See note 29
supra.
55. 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6163 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
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and Rodgers v. United States Stee, 57 the courts held that affirma-
tive action plans constituted "work product" and therefore were
protected from disclosure by rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.58
The term "work product" was initially articulated in Hickman
v. Taylor . The Hickman court used the term to describe materi-
als collected by an attorney in anticipation of litigation, 0 a concept
developed more fully in later cases."' Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(b)(3) subsequently was enacted as a codification of the
Hickman doctrine as modified by the later decisions.6 2
Under rule 26(b)(3), a document must be "prepared in antici-
pation of litigation or for trial" to come under the protection of the
work product privilege.63 The test for determining whether a docu-
ment is protected by the privilege is whether, in light of the nature
of the document and the factual circumstances of the particular
case, the document can be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation." The work product privilege
does not apply to materials prepared primarily in the regular
course of business, even when litigation already is pending.
65
The restrictions on the work product privilege preclude any
application of the privilege to affirmative action plans sought in
the course of discrimination cases. Affirmative action plans are
prepared by companies seeking contracts with the federal govern-
ment.6  Executive Order No. 11,246 gives those companies no
choice but to comply with the guidelines if they choose to con-
56. 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5520 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
57. 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6815 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See generally Note, Discovery of Attorney's Work Prod-
uct, 12 GON. L. REv. 284 (1977); Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REv. 333 (1978).
59. 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1946), aff'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
60. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 197-98 (1970).
61. Id. at 193.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) provides in part: "[A] party may obtain discovery of doc-
uments and tangible things otherwise discoverable under ... this rule and prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation or for trial ... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means." See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 197-98 (1970).
63. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 197 (1970).
64. Id. at 198.
65. Id. at 199.
66. See text accompanying notes 4-11 supra.
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tract.67 Furthermore, any company executive is capable of prepar-
ing plans that conform to the current guidelines, and it is not nec-
essary that a lawyer take part in the preparation of a plan. 8 The
mere presence of a lawyer on the committee that drafts the plan is
insufficient to invoke the privilege. Thus, the plans are not being
prepared in anticipation of litigation; the affirmative action plans
are created for the purpose of enabling an employer to participate
in government contracts and should not be considered immune
from disclosure requests on the basis of the work product privilege.
The Public Policy Privilege
Public policy considerations have figured prominently in most
cases denying plaintiffs' affirmative action plan discovery re-
quests.69 Although the rationale underlying these decisions has
been described in different terms by the courts,7 0 the thrust of the
public policy concern is that requiring contractors to disclose af-
firmative action plans may result in less than candid self-evalua-
tions in the future. For example, in Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia
Co.,71 the first case to discuss whether affirmative action plans are
privileged on the basis of public policy, the court found that grant-
ing the plaintiff's discovery request would be contrary to public
policy in that it would "discourage frank self-criticism and evalua-
tion in the development of affirmative action programs of this
kind.17 2 Several other cases denying discovery of the plans use sim-
ilar language. In Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp.,73 the
court rejected the plaintiff's request for affirmative action plan dis-
closure, stating: "Disclosure of such subjective information could
67. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1979).
68. The regulations promulgated under Executive Order No. 11,246 require "the con-
tractor" to develop the affirmative action plan. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40(a) (1979). See also id. §
60-2. The regulations governing the creation and implementation of the affirmative action
plans are comprehensive; none of the sections setting forth procedures for the plans requires
legal knowledge or training.
69. See Johnson v. Southern Ry., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6639, 6645 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Parker v. Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6163, 6164-65 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Stevenson v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5148, 5149 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Sanday v. Carnegie-Mellon
Univ., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6795, 6796 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 4
Empl. Prac. Dec. 5520, 5521-22 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
70. See cases cited note 69 supra.
71. 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5520 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
72. Id. at 5521.
73. 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5070 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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discourage employers from making the candid internal evaluations
that the affirmative action programs envision.
''7 4
None of the cases denying plaintiffs' discovery requests ade-
quately defines the basis for the public policy privilege; the courts
have summarily accepted defendants' public policy assertions
without fully discussing the issues involved.7 5 The most complete
statement of the privilege appears in the case of Webb v. Westing-
house Electric Corp. 6 in which the court rejected the public policy
argument and granted the plaintiff's discovery request. In West-
inghouse, the defendant claimed that its affirmative action plans
should be shielded from discovery on the grounds that the plans
contained "self-critical analysis."' 7 The court noted:
The theoretical basis for the defense of "self-critical analysis"
stems from the public policy which recognizes that voluntary
compliance by employers with federal equal employment oppor-
tunity laws is essential for implementation of the policy of equal
opportunity in employment. In furtherance of voluntary compli-
ance, employers must be encouraged to be candid and forthright
in assessing their employment practices and setting goals and
timetables for eradicating policies deemed to be discriminatory in
operation or effect. If subjective materials constituting "self-criti-
cal analysis" are subject to disclosure during discovery, this dis-
closure would tend to have a "chilling effect" on an employer's
voluntary compliance with equal employment laws. 78
The courts allowing defendants' claims that the affirmative ac-
tion plans are privileged on the basis of public policy have offered
little justification for their conclusions. One clue to the courts' rea-
soning appears in Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co.79 The Banks
court, in accepting the defendant's statement of the need for pro-
tection of the plans, cited the case of Bredice v. Doctor's Hospi-
tal80 as support for its decision.81
74. Id. at 5071.
75. See cases cited note 69 supra.
76. 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
77. Id. at 433.
78. Id.
79. 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5520 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
80. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
81. 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 5521. The reasoning of the Banks court has been cited by
other courts upholding the public policy privilege. See, e.g., Johnson v. Southern Ry., 19
Empl. Prac. Dec. 6639, 6645 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Parker v. Kroger Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6163, 6165 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Stevenson v. General Elec. Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5148, 5149
(S.D. Ohio 1978); Sanday v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6795, 6796 (W.D.
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Bredice involved a malpractice action brought against the de-
fendant hospital. The plaintiff attempted to discover the reports of
a hospital committee that evaluated the treatment of patients by
hospital doctors. The court denied the plaintiff access to the re-
ports, holding that discovery would end candor in the committee's
operation.2 Such candor, the court reasoned, was necessary to en-
sure the quality of medical treatment: "candid and conscientious
evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of adequate hospi-
tal care."8 The court in Bredice thus concluded that the public
interest in denying disclosure outweighed the need to release the
plans. 4
A few cases have rejected the Bredice privilege and allowed
plaintiffs in personal injury suits to obtain committee reports.85
Most cases, however, have followed the Bredice rule,86 and com-
mentators generally have approved of the Bredice court's reason-
ing. 87 State legislatures also have shown themselves to be in agree-
ment with Bredice; twenty-two states have passed statutes
prohibiting disclosure of reports of medical review committees.8
Pa. 1975).
82. 50 F.R.D. at 249-50.
83. Id. at 250.
84. Id. at 250-51.
85. See, e.g., Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177
(Ky. 1973); Young v. King, 136 N.J. Super. 127, 344 A.2d 792 (1975); Shibilski v. St. Jo-
seph's Hosp., 83 Wis. 2d 459, 266 N.W.2d 264 (1978); Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977). See also Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D.
316 (1971) (narrowly construing the Bredice privilege and allowing discovery of edited testi-
mony given before a medical review board). But see Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Superior Court,
248 Cal. App. 2d 359, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1967) (decided prior to Bredice; disallowed discov-
ery of Committee Reports).
86. See Tucson Medical Center Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976);
Jolly v. Superior Court, 112 Ariz. 186, 540 P.2d 658 (1975); Dade County Medical Ass'n v.
HLIS, 372 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Oviatt v. Archibishop Bergan Mercy Hosp.,
191 Neb. 224, 214 N.W.2d 490 (1974). See also Brown v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d
430, 32 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1963) (decided prior to Bredice: applied California law); Judd v.
Park Avenue Hosp., 37 Misc. 2d 614, 235 N.Y.S.2d 843, aff'd, 18 A.D.2d 766, 235 N.Y.S.2d
1023 (1962) (disallowing discovery of the reports on the grounds that the reports were hear-
say, not discoverable in New York).
87. See Bernstein, Access to Physicians' Hospital Records, 45 J. AM. Hosp. 148 (1977);
Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, 1 AM. J.L. &
MED. 245, 277 (1975). But see Holbrook & Dunn, Medical Malpractice Litigation: The
Discoverability and Use of Hospitals' Quality Assurance Committee Records, 16 WASHBURN
L.J. 54, 76 (1977) (arguing that disclosure of committee records will not result in decreased
candor).
88. See Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings And Reports: Their Legal Status, 1
AM. J.L. & MED. 245, 274-75 (1975).
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Although the scope of protection provided by the statutes varies,89
they all present obstacles for plaintiffs who attempt to obtain such
committee reports.
The use of the Bredice rationale in Banks supplies insight into
the courts' acceptance of the public policy defense. The opinion in
Banks implies that the need for candor in the drafting of affirma-
tive action plans is similar to that required in hospital evaluations
and that disclosures posing a threat to candor must be carefully
considered. However, while the Bredice privilege may be necessary
to protect hospital review committee reports, it is questionable
whether a similar privilege is needed to protect the disclosure of
affirmative action plans. The circumstances surrounding the Bred-
ice privilege differ greatly from those involved in cases involving
alleged discrimination.
One important distinction between hospital committee reports
and affirmative action plans is the purpose for which such docu-
ments are drafted. This difference has been stressed in cases re-
jecting the application of the Bredice privilege to affirmative action
plans in FOIA suits.90 In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld,91 the
defendant claimed that the compliance agency should be pre-
vented from supplying the EEOC with copies of the defendant's
affirmative action plans under the Bredice rule. The Fourth Circuit
rejected the defendant's contention, 2 noting that the reports were
ultimately to be used in administration of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. As the responsibility for enforcing the Civil Rights Act rests
with the EEOC, and the defendant had notice of that fact, the
court held that the defendant could not claim that it was protected
by Bredice from disclosing the reports to the EEOC.93
In an identical factual situation, the defendant in Emerson
Electric Co. v. Schlesinger94 also asserted the Bredice privilege.
Again, the court rejected the defendant's claim of privilege, hold-
ing that
unlike the situation in Bredice, the [affirmative action] reports
* . . are not made solely for internal use .... [affirmative action
plans] and other documents are submitted to the [Office of Fed-
89. Id. at 275.
90. See text accompanying notes 20-49 supra.
91. 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 667.
93. Id.
94. 609 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1979).
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eral Contract Compliance Programs] with the express under-
standing that they will be used in the administration of Executive
Order 11246 and the Civil Rights Act. 5
The purpose for which the affirmative action plans are drafted
is not the only important difference between the hospital commit-
tee reports, protected by the Bredice privilege, and such plans. An-
other significant distinction is the weight to be given defendants'
predictions regarding the effect of allowing access to the requested
materials. In both situations, defendants argue that disclosure of
the documents will harm the public interest by eliminating consci-
entious evaluations in future reports. The assertion is appealing;
reduced candor in both hospital quality committee reports and em-
ployers' affirmative action plan self-evaluations would be contrary
to the public interest. However, there is a strong safeguard against
the dangers of unconscientious self-evaluation in future affirmative
action plans. Severe sanctions are available for use against employ-
ers who fail to comply with the requirements of Executive Order
No. 11,246 and the regulations promulgated under it9 6
The impact of available sanctions upon defendants' policy pre-
dictions was emphasized by the court in Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Schlesinger.9 7 In Hughes, the defendant company raised the public
policy defense in a FOIA suit instituted to obtain affirmative ac-
tion plans. The court rejected the defendant's argument. It noted
that the defendant was subject to statutory and regulatory duties
to file the requested information and stressed that failure to file
the requested information "would be an act of bad faith and ex-
pose the contractor to penalties."98
Several of the sanctions available under the Order have a po-
tentially substantial impact on a federal contractor." The Director
of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance0 ° may cancel, termi-
95. Id. at 907.
96. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209, 3 C.F.R. 339, 343-44 (1964-65 Compilation), re-
printed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). See also 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.26 to .32
(1979).
97. 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
98. Id. at 296.
99. See BARRISTER, Fall, 1976, at 76.
100. The Director acts under the authority of the Secretary of Labor in policing af-
firmative action plan compliance. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209(a)(5), 3 C.F.R. 339




nate, or suspend the offender's government contract.10' The Direc-
tor also has the power to debar the contractor from participating
in future government contracts."0 2 Alternatively, the Director may
refer the violations to the Department of Justice prior to exhaust-
ing administrative remedies.103 The Department of Justice may
choose to enforce the contractual provisions of the Order, seek in-
junctive relief, or demand additional relief, including back pay.1
0 4
These sanctions are available for anything less than a candid
self-evaluation produced by defendants asserting a public policy
privilege. Sanctions under the Order may be imposed for any sub-
stantial or material violation, or threat of violation, of the Order or
the regulations.10 5 In addition, the regulations require that an em-
ployer make a good faith "analysis of areas within which the con-
tractor is deficient in the utilization of minority groups and wo-
men."'01 6  Therefore, the deliberately vague self-evaluations
envisioned by those asserting the public policy privilege would vio-
101. See note 100 supra. Authorities will resolve a breach of any of the provisions of
the Executive Order or the regulations by informal means whenever possible. Exec. Order
No. 11,246, § 209(b), 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976). See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.20(c) (1979). If the informal methods are not successful
and an administrative hearing officer finds that violations continue, official sanctions will be
invoked. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(2) (1979); Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 208(b), 190(a)(6), 3
C.F.R. 339, 343-44 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
102. Exec. Order No. 11,246, §§ 208(b), 209(a)(6), 3 C.F.R. 339, 343-44 (1964-1965
Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(c) (1979).
This regulation provides that a contractor must be afforded an opportunity for a judicial or
administrative hearing before he or she is debarred from future government contracts under
§ 209(a)(6). However, a contractor found to be violating the regulations or the provisions of
the Order may be "passed over" as a bidder for two government contracts without an ad-
ministrative hearing. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Marshall, 441 F. Supp. 1110, 1116-18 (E.D.
La. 1977). For a general discussion of the processes of federal government contract suspen-
sion and debarment, see Steadman, "Banned in Boston-and Birmingham and Boise and
• . .": Due Process in the Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors, 27 HAs-
TINGs L.J. 793 (1976).
103. Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 207, 3 C.F.R. 339. 343 (1964-1965 Compilation), re-
printed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a)(2) (1979).
104. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, § 209(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. 339, 343-44 (1964-1965 Compi-
lation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(e) (1979). See generally,
Note, Recovery of Back Pay Under Executive Order 11,246, 52 S. CAL L. REV. 767 (1979).
105. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a)(1)(vii) (1979). Section 1.26(a)(1) also provides that viola-
tions of the regulations may be found in: "(i) The results of a complaint investigation...
(iii) the results of an on-site review of the contractor's compliance with the Order and its
implementing regulations, (iv) an employer's refusal to submit an affirmative action pro-
gram; (v) a contractor's refusal to allow an on-site compliance review to be conducted; [or]
(vi) a contractor's refusal to supply records or other information as required by these regula-
tions or applicable construction industry requirements."
106. Id. § 60-2.10.
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late the regulations. Finally, faulty analysis of an affirmative action
plan is prohibited as a violation of the Order.10 7 Therefore, the an-
ticipated diminution in candor in the self-evaluations contained in
future affirmative action plans would subject the contractor to the
threat of substantial penalties.
The severity of the sanctions available for nonconscientious
analysis lessens the force of defendants' arguments for a public
policy privilege. If a hospital quality review committee learns that
its reports could be disclosed to third parties, it is free to tailor the
evaluations in the reports as it chooses. Unlike the review commit-
tee, however, a government employer-contractor is under statutory
and regulatory duties to evaluate its affirmative action plans con-
scientiously and candidly. If the employer fails to do so, it is sub-
ject to severe penalties. Studies have shown that past efforts to
enforce these duties are sporadic and inefficient, 108 and indeed that
the number of contractors who actually are debarred from future
contracts for violations of Executive Order No. 11,246 is not
large.109 However, because government contracts provide a major
source of income for many of the contracting companies, 11° the de-
barment of a few contracting companies may deter many others
from failing to comply.111 Further, the need for more diligent en-
forcement of the provisions of Executive Order No. 11,246 should
107. Id. § 60-1.26(a)(1)(ii).
108. See N. BENOKRAITIS & J. FEAGIN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY:
ACTION, INACTION, REACTION 10,317 (1978); Galloway & Ronfeldt, Enforcing the Affirmative
Action Requirements of Executive Order 11,246, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 481, 482-83 (1974);
Galloway, Administrative and Judicial Nullification of Federal Affirmative Action Law, 17
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 559, 564-72 (1977).
109. One study shows that five contrators had been barred from future government
contracts for violations of Executive Order No. 11,246 prior to 1975. In 1975, four additional
contractors were debarred. Steadman, "Banned in Boston-and Birmingham and Boise and
. . .": Due Process in the Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors, 27 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 793, 876 (1976).
110. See id. at 793.
111. Agency policing of violations can also be spurred by private litigants. Although an
individual has no private right of action to sue for redress for injury under Executive Order
No. 11,246, see Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1975), a private plaintiff
who has exhausted administrative remedies may obtain a writ of mandate compelling the
agencies to comply with the edicts of Executive Order No. 11,246 and the regulations
promulgated to enforce the Order. See Lewis v. Western Airlines, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 684, 689
(N.D. Cal. 1974). See generally Galloway & Ronfeldt, Enforcing the Affirmative Action Re-
quirements of Executive Order 11,246, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE RE V. 481 (1974). Such a litigant
could well encourage debarment proceedings against a noncomplying contractor.
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not be a sufficient justification for preventing the disclosure of af-
firmative action plans in cases of alleged discrimination under Ti-
tle VII.
The Bredice privilege thus should not preclude discovery of
affirmative action plans. The plans differ from the hospital review
reports in both the purpose for which they were drafted and the
potential effect of disclosure to third parties. These considerations
suggest that the application of a blanket public policy privilege to
protect the plans is an inappropriate solution. The public policy
approach is unsatisfactory for an additional reason. The courts fail
in their determinations to consider plaintiffs' interests in obtaining
the plans. Although this omission would not be disturbing if the
defendants' interests were consistently overwhelming in all affirm-
ative action plan discovery requests, this is obviously not the case.
The courts, therefore, should develop a method of balancing the
potential harms and benefits which could result from affirmative
action plan disclosure.
The Ligon-Westinghouse Test: A Suggested
Approach
Elements of the approaches used by courts in the cases of
Ligon v. Frito-Lay, Inc.112 and Webb v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.113 could be synthesized to provide a uniform test for affirma-
tive action plan disclosure. Under this approach, a court faced with
a discovery request would make a thorough in camera examination
of the affirmative action plans as suggested in Ligon. The court
would then fully explore the benefits and detriments to be ex-
pected from disclosure of the plans in light of the circumstances of
the case. Finally, the court would apply the standard set forth in
Westinghouse to evaluate the impact of disclosure.
In Camera Review
Ligon was the first case to suggest the use of an in camera
review" 4 to resolve affirmative action plan discovery conflicts. In
112. 19 F.E.P. Cas. 722 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
113. 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
114. 19 F.E.P. Cas. at 723. The court in Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec.
6026 (N.D. Ga. 1978), also utilized an in camera review to determine whether to allow dis-
covery of the plans. In Brown, the court stated: "The abundance of conflicting authority in
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Ligon, the court rejected the defendant's public policy and work
product arguments, noting that an in camera review would prevent
the release of privileged materials and that the issuance of a pro-
tective order would stop the plaintiff from disclosing the docu-
ments to the general community.
115
The somewhat perfunctory approach used in Ligon is not an
entirely satisfactory method of resolving affirmative action plan
disclosure problems. Use of an in camera review would allow the
courts to evaluate assertions that focus on the specific information
contained in the plans themselves. The courts, therefore, would be
able to evaluate defendants' claims that the plans contain confi-
dential business information and plaintiffs' assertions that the
plans are relevant to the Title VII case. If portions of the plans did
contain confidential business information not relevant to the case,
these portions could be deleted from the plans during the review.
However, the restricted scope of the Ligon review prevents a
proper resolution of the conflicting interests of the parties. The fo-
cus on the plans themselves in the Ligon approach results in the
failure to take account of those interests of the parties that are not
apparent on the face of the plans. To resolve fully the conflict of
interests presented by an affirmative action plan discovery request,
a court must consider all factors relevant to the respective interests
of the parties involved.
The Defendant's Interests: Factors Favoring Protection
In evaluating the interests supporting protection of affirmative
action plans, a court should carefully scrutinize public policy
claims made by the defendant. Although public policy considera-
tions alone are insufficient to justify an absolute privilege," 6 they
should be taken into account in considering whether discovery of
the plans should be allowed. In determining the weight to be given
the cases suggests that the law has not yet struck a definitive balance between the compet-
ing considerations of a plaintiff's right to full discovery and the desire not to discourage the
highly desirable self-evaluation and improvement that affirmative action plans assist. The
court believes that, as no clear rule exists, the more prudent course is to order in camera
inspection of the disputed plans. This procedure will permit the court to evaluate both the
danger that limited disclosure of the plans through discovery would pose and the impor-
tance of the plans to the plaintiff's case." Id. at 6026. See also Dickerson v. United States
Steel Corp., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5070, 5071 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
115. 19 F.E.P. Cas. at 722-23.
116. See text accompanying notes 69-110 supra.
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to this factor the court might review the extent of the contractor's
self-evaluation in the plans. For example, if the self-analysis is less
than complete, a defendant's predictions of incomplete analysis in
the future should be entitled to little weight. The court could also
consider independent evidence of the defendant's relative commit-
ment to affirmative action; if the defendant has repeatedly violated
civil rights mandates, disclosure of the plans is unlikely to be
detrimental.
The court should carefully evaluate assertions that plans con-
tain sensitive or confidential business information. The evaluation
should be conducted in light of the relevant conditions in the de-
fendant's industry at the time of the suit, noting, for example, the
competitive nature of the industry and the likelihood that compet-
itive disadvantage may result from disclosure. The court should
question the confidentiality of the plans within the company itself,
considering whether the plans are used for other purposes within
the company, the number of people who have access to the plans,
and whether the defendant releases all or part of the plan data to
industrial survey programs.
If the court finds that the affirmative action plans contain con-
fidential business information, it should determine whether a pro-
tective order prohibiting the plaintiff from disclosing the informa-
tion would resolve the potential problem.11" 7 Under rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may make a variety of
orders for the protection of participants in the discovery process.1 '
Further, rule 26(c)(7) provides that a defendant may request a pro-
tective order declaring that "confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a
designated way," 119 and under rule 26(c)(7), the court could make
an appropriate order preventing public disclosure of the informa-
tion contained in the plans.
120
If the defendant has failed to move for a protective order, a
plaintiff hoping to extinguish the defendant's "confidentiality" ob-
117. See Ligon v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 19 F.E.P. Cas. 722, 723 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
119. Id. 26(c)(7).
120. See Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 964 (1965) (discussing rule 30(b), the predecessor to the present rule 26(c)). See
also Turmenne v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1967) (public disclo-
sure forbidden, but no discussion of the underlying rule); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec.
Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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jections may request such an order.121 The motion could be made
on the grounds that the order is one "which justice requires to pro-
tect a party or person from . . . oppression. "122 In many cases,
such an order will protect the defendant's interests and do away
with this consideration altogether.
It is unclear what effect disclosure of the plans may have upon
EEOC conciliation proceedings.1 23 Although private plaintiffs play
an important role in the enforcement process of Title VII, 124 en-
forcement of the Act is primarily accomplished by informal concili-
ation and negotiation between the employer and the EEOC.
1 25
This emphasis results from the belief that discrimination is more
effectively eliminated by broad and systematic agreements than by
individual lawsuits. 26 Under one view, if conciliation efforts are in
progress or are impending, disclosures that further individual suits
may hamper the conciliation proceeding.1 27 In Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 28 a 1975 case, the Supreme Court noted:
"We recognize ... that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter
efforts at conciliation, that lack of success in the legal action could
weaken the Commission's efforts to induce voluntary compliance
.i *"2e Under this view, because the employer may negotiate
with the Commission to avoid litigation,13 0 its incentive to settle
may diminish if it. continues to face private suits.' 1 If conciliation
121. See Central Hide & Rendering Co. v. B-M-K Corp., 19 F.R.D. 296 (D. Del. 1956).
See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDEMRAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 267-70 (1970).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
123. Section 706(b) of Title VII provides in part: "If the Commission determines af-
ter ... investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1976). See generally Katz, Investigation And Conciliation of Employment Discrimination
Charges Under Title VII: Employers' Rights in an Adversary Process, 28 HASTINGS L.J.
877 (1977).
124. See text accompanying notes 140-47 infra.
125. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). See also note 123
supra.
126. See Comment, Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private Employers, 46 U. CH.
L. RE V. 477, 488-89 (1979).
127. Id. at 479-80. See also Katz, Investigation and Conciliation of Employment Dis-
crimination Charges under Title VII: Employers' Rights in an Adversary Process, 28 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 877, 878-79 (1977) (describing the power of the EEOC to influence employer com-
pliance in conciliation proceedings). But see text accompanying notes 140-41 infra.
128. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
129. Id. at 461.
130. See id.
131. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has expressed a different view on this
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proceedings are in progress at the time a plaintiff seeks discovery
of the plans, the court should consider whether the goals of Title
VII will be better effectuated by denying discovery and encourag-
ing conciliation.
The Other Side of the Scale: Factors Favoring
Disclosure
In evaluating factors favoring affirmative action plan disclo-
sure, courts should consider initially whether the plaintiff is able,
without possession of the plans, to articulate a credible basis for a
Title VII suit. The court need not determine whether the plaintiff
can prove the elements of a Title VII case. However, evidence that
the suit is brought to harass a defendant, or otherwise is not in
good faith, is relevant to the issue of a plaintiff's legitimate need
for discovery of the plans. Such evidence weighs heavily against
disclosure.
Once the court has considered the plaintiff's good faith in
bringing the suit, it should consider the burden of proof imposed
upon Title VII plaintiffs. In a Title VII action, the plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof in establishing a prima facie case of dis-
crimination.13 2 The burden then shifts to the employer, requiring it
to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the al-
leged discriminatory acts.133 If the employer is able to do so, the
plaintiff is given an opportunity to demonstrate that the em-
ployer's stated basis for the disputed acts is in fact a pretext.
A Title VII plaintiff frequently has difficulty in meeting his or
point. See text accompanying notes 140-41 infra.
132. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Title VII litigants
frequently use statistics to prove or rebut a prima facie case. See Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 225 n.34, 231 n.44 (5th Cir. 1974). For a discussions of the uses
of statistics to prove or rebut a Title VII case, see Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothe-
sis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1980); Comment,
Statistics and Title VII Proof: Prima Facie Case and Rebuttal, 15 Hous. L. REV. 1930
(1978); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statisti-
cal Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HArv. L. REv. 387 (1975). For a discussion of the evolution of
Title VII prima facie case law under the Burger Court, see Friedman, The Burger Court and
the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL
L. REv. 1 (1979).
133. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Supreme Court
recently held that the employer's burden in this respect is one of production, not persua-
sion; the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would show the trier of fact
that the act had not been motivated by a discriminatory intent. Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 49 U.S.L.W. 4214, 4217 (1981).
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her burden of proof.13' Proof of discriminatory practices is rarely
direct, and the employee is at an inherent disadvantage in gather-
ing evidence of employment discrimination.18 This difficulty is in-
creased by "the typically impecunious position of the Title VII
plaintiff. A victim of employment discrimination often will not
have the financial resources to support a lawsuit; without substan-
tial information about his claim, he may be unable to obtain coun-
sel on a contingent-fee basis."1318 Because of the difficulty of docu-
menting a charge of discriminatory practices, the scope of
discovery is particularly broad in a Title VII case. 7 This policy of
broad discovery in all Title VII cases, based upon judicial recogni-
tion of the difficulties in meeting the Title VII burden of proof,
provides a weighty argument in favor of disclosure. In some in-
stances additional difficulties facing a particular plaintiff may be
relevant to the evaluation.138
Another important consideration bearing upon the need for
disclosure is the need to encourage the participation of private liti-
gants in the Title VII enforcement process. As noted above, Title
VII was designed to be enforced principally through informal con-
ciliation procedures.139 In a recent case,14 ° the Supreme Court sug-
gested that disclosure of EEOC investigative materials to private
litigants could expedite conciliation proceedings. The Court noted
that disclosure of information to private plaintiffs could improve
the Commission's ability to resolve charges through informal
means, stating: "A party is far more likely to settle when he has
enough information to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his
opponent's case as well as his own. 1141
134. See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 527 (6th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976) (citing cases).
135. 532 F.2d at 527.
136. Comment, Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private Employers, 46 U. CHL L.
REV. 477, 487 (1979).
137. See notes 50-51 & accompanying text supra.
138. For example, there may be evidence that the plaintiff has been unable to obtain
documentation of his or her charge because of defendant's bad faith discovery responses in
this--or other--discrimination suits. Consideration of this factor may involve substantial
problems of relevancy, proof, and res judicata. The court may wish to disregard this factor
entirely as a result of these difficulties. However, if direct evidence shows that the defendant
has attempted to discourage Title VII suits through bad faith discovery responses, it can
possibly be inferred that plaintiff's need for the plans is substantial.
139. See note 125 & accompanying text supra.
140. Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 49 U.S.L.W. 4149 (1981).
141. Id. at 4151.
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The role of the private litigant assumes increased importance
if the EEOC has failed to bring conciliation proceedings, or if such
proceedings have failed. 4" The EEOC has insufficient resources to
pursue legal action in ninety percent of the cases in which concilia-
tion is unsuccessful.1 4 If conciliation is not in progress, the compli-
cations and expense resulting from the defense of several individ-
ual suits in fact might encourage an employer to initiate
conciliation and settle all the claims.4 Additionally, it can be ar-
gued that prosecution of individual suits, where more general at-
tempts have failed, serves the public interest.145 The Supreme
Court has noted: "[T]he private right of action remains an essen-
tial means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII .... In
such cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own injury
but also vindicates the important congressional policy against dis-
criminatory employment practices.
1 46
The Westinghouse Standard for Disclosure
Once a court has evaluated the interests of the parties-and
the public-in an affirmative action plan discovery suit, it must
determine whether to grant plaintiffs discovery request. If the in-
terests of either party completely outweigh the interests of the
other, the court's decision is simple. In most cases, however, the
considerations may be strong on both sides. Where the interests of
the plaintiff and the defendant seem equally strong, the situation
is more complex and the court must determine which to favor. The
answer is provided by the decision in Webb v. Westinghouse Elec-
142. Some commentators have suggested that agency enforcement of civil rights laws
is largely ineffective. See Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VmD. L. REv. 905 (1978); Galloway, Admin-
istrative and Judicial Nullification of Federal Affirmative Action Law, 17 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 559, 564-72 (1977).
143. See BNA EEOC COMPLIANCE MAINAL, SuMMARY op no LATEST DEVELOPMENTs
No. 7 (Aug. 6, 1976).
144. See Note, Disclosure of EEOC Files to Title VII Litigants, 54 N.Y.U. L. Ray.
1013, 1033 (1979).
145. See Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 49 U.S.L.W. 4149, 4152 (1981). See
also Note, Disclosure of EEOC Files to Title VII Litigants, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1013, 1033
(1979); Comment, Access to EEOC Files Concerning Private Employers, 46 U. CHL. L. Rav.
477, 487 (1979).
146. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974). See Comment, A Sur-
vey of Remedies under Title VII, 5 COLUM. HuMAN RIGHTs L. REv. 437, 438 (1973). One
manifestation of this policy has been that courts are reluctant to award attorneys' fees to
successful defendants because they do not wish to discourage private plaintiffs. Id. at 446.
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tric Corp.
147
In Westinghouse, the court set guidelines for affirmative ac-
tion plan disclosure in cases in which both parties have demon-
strated that substantial interests are involved in the discovery is-
sue. The court acknowledged that the defendant's public policy
arguments were valid. It also discussed the importance of eliminat-
ing employment discrimination. After examining the cases denying
discovery of affirmative action plans, the court articulated a stan-
dard based on decisions in those cases:
[S]everal factors emerge as potential guideposts for the appli-
cation of the "self-critical analysis" defense. First, materials pro-
tected have generally been those prepared for mandatory govern-
mental reports. Second, only subjective evaluative materials have
been protected; objective data contained in those same reports in
no case have been protected. Finally, courts have been sensitive
to the need of the plaintiffs for such materials, and have denied
discovery only where the policy favoring exclusion of the materi-
als clearly outweighed plaintiff's need.
148
The preference for discovery in the Westinghouse test is justi-
fied by the extremely broad scope of discovery in federal courts
149
and the special emphasis on liberal discovery in Title VII cases.
Under this standard, the courts would deny discovery only when
the factors favoring protection "clearly outweigh" the plaintiff's
need for discovery. The Ligon- Westinghouse approach, consisting
of an in camera review, evaluation of the competing interests of
the parties, and denial of discovery only when a defendant can
show that a preponderance of factors favor protection, provides a
uniform approach that balances the competing interests in affirma-
tive action plan discovery requests.
Conclusion
Whether a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit may
discover a defendant employer's affirmative action plans remains
unclear. Obtaining the plans under the FOLA has proven difficult.
When a Title VII plaintiff attempts to discover affirmative action
plans, the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant come into
conflict. The work product privilege applied by some courts to de-
147. 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
148. Id. at 434.
149. See notes 50-51 & accompanying text supra.
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feat disclosure should be entirely inapplicable to prevent disclosure
of the plans. A routine application of the blanket "public policy"
privilege to bar discovery is also unsatisfactory because it fails to
take into account the interests of the plaintiff in discovering the
plans.
A better approach is one in which the court reviews the plans
in camera and then balances the interests of both parties to the
suit. The court should protect the plans from disclosure only when
the interests favoring protection "clearly outweigh" plaintiff's need
for discovery. This procedure, a synthesis of the Ligon v. Frito-Lay
and Webb v. Westinghouse cases, best resolves the competing in-
terests inherent in a plaintiff's affirmative action plan discovery
request.

